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1. Introduction 
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies suggest that culture affects economic outcomes and 
institutions within countries (see e.g., Spolaore and Wacziard, 2013). However, contemporaneous 
culture might be endogenous to economic outcomes and institutions. In a highly influential paper 
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2016) employ a set of innovative instruments to address endogeneity 
concerns and, thus, establish a convincing relationship between individualistic culture and growth.  
Following the identification strategy of Gorodnichenko and Roland (2016), this work examines 
one dimension of culture that can be seen as relevant to welfare policies: individualism versus 
collectivism.1 Fiscal redistribution is proxied by government subsidies and transfers, as well as 
health and education expenses that entail a dimension of redistribution (Desmet et al., 2009). To 
deal with the usual identification concerns, we instrument culture by a set of genetic, 
epidemiological and linguistic data that have been linked empirically to collectivism (see Kashima 
and Kashima, 1998; Murray and Schaller, 2010; Way and Liebermann, 2010). Our analysis suggests 
that countries characterized by higher levels of individualism present higher levels of redistributive 
spending. 
 
2. Data and Theoretical Considerations 
Our data covers a wide cross-section of countries. The dependent variables in our analysis are fiscal 
spending accounts, which are used as proxies redistribution by the relevant literature. (e.g., Desmet 
et al. 2009). Specifically, we employ as dependent variable interchangeably: (i) government 
subsidies and transfers (% GDP) and (ii) health and education expenses (% GDP) from 1980-2004.2  
 The key explanatory variable in our analysis is culture. In particular, we focus on one 
dimension of culture: individualism versus collectivism. Individualism is a cultural trait that 
emphasizes personal freedom and achievement and awards social status to personal 
                                                 
1
 To the best of our knowledge this is the first study that investigates directly the relationship between 
individualism/collectivism and fiscal redistribution. However, there are two parallel strands of the literature closely 
related to our analysis. The first concentrates on the relationship between family structure and implemented welfare 
policies (e.g., Esping and Andersen, 1999), whereas the second investigates the potential relationship between 
JHQHUDOL]HGWUXVWWKDWLVWUXVWLQ³RXW-JURXS´UHODWLRQVKLSVDQGZHOIDUH state (e.g., Berg and Bjørnskov, 2011). Both 
strands chime with a negative relationship between collectivistic norms and welfare state. More precisely, Esping and 
Andersen (1999) suggest that close family ties provide a social security net to the individuals that otherwise would be 
provided by the formal state. Similarly, Berg and Bjørnskov (2011) argue that a higher level of generalized trust - which 
is a basic characteristic of more individualistic societies - mitigates the temptation of free riding and allows for the 
universal provision of public goods, transfers and services.  
2
 Data are obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). 
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accomplishments that make an individual stand out. On the other hand, collectivism emphasizes the 
embeddedness RI LQGLYLGXDOV LQ ODUJHU JURXSV DQG HQFRXUDJHV FRQIRUPLW\ WR ³LQ-JURXS´
relationships (see Triandis, 1995). As a main proxy for individualistic/collectivistic culture, we 
employ the measure developed by Hofstede (2001) with higher values indicating more 
individualistic societies (denoted as individualism).  
The theoretical relationship between this dimension of culture and fiscal redistribution is a 
priori ambiguous. This is because, on the one hand, welfare state is a formal risk sharing institution 
that provides a VDIHW\QHW WR³XQOXFN\´ LQGLYLGXDOV, whereas collectivistic norms -such as strong 
family ties- serve as informal risk sharing agreements that also protect individuals against risk (see 
Esping and Andersen, 1999). According to this argument, collectivism and welfare policies operate 
as substitutes and, thus, we should expect a negative association between the two ± or a positive one 
between more individualism and redistribution.  The reason is that, in the absence of formal risk 
sharing institutions (i.e. before the formation of welfare state), societies facing increased risks, such 
as climate variability or a higher prevalence of lethal diseases, developed informal insurance 
contracts (i.e. extenGHGQHWZRUNVRI³LQJURXS´UHODWLRQVKLSVWRWDFNOHWKHLVVXHRIXQFHUWDLQW\VHH
e.g. Murray and Schaller, 2010). For this reason, more collectivistic (individualistic) societies were 
in lower (higher) need of protection from the state when welfare policies were put in place. On the 
other hand, preferences for redistribution are endogenous to formal institutions. Therefore, a larger 
(narrower) welfare state may lead to collectivistic (individualistic) norms and hence increased 
(decreased) demand for fiscal redistribution (see e.g., Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln, 2007). If this 
is the case, collectivism and redistributive policies will function as complements rather than 
substitutes. Being theoretically ambiguous, an empirical investigation will shed more light on the 
sign of the association between individualism and welfare policies. 
 
3. Identification Strategy 
Our analysis relies on contemporaneous measures of culture which might be endogenous to the 
implemented economic policy. To address the usual endogeneity concerns, we employ a battery of 
alternative instruments that have been linked empirically to collectivism. Following Gorodnichenko 
and Roland (2016), our basic instrument is the Mahalanobis distance between the frequency of blood 
types in a given country and the UK, which is the second most individualistic country in our sample. 
Genetic markers are probably the cleanest instruments by not being correlated to fiscal redistribution 
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through any other channel other than culture, thus satisfying the exclusion restriction. We denote 
this as blood distance from the UK. Employing this instrument has two major advantages. First, 
blood distance from the UK is a neutral genetic marker that allows us to rule out reverse causality 
concerns. This is because different blood types are not expected to affect intelligence and output. 
Second, the frequency of alleles determining blood types is a widely available genetic information 
that ensures a large number of cross-country observations. Figure 1 plots government transfers along 
with health and educational expenses against blood distance from the UK. As can be seen, countries 
that are further away in terms of blood distance from the UK present a lower level of redistributive 
spending. It must be stressed that the use of genetic data does not surmise any causal effect between 
genetic and cultural distance. Genetic markers are used exclusively as a proxy for transmission of 
cultural traits from parents to offspring. In other words, our analysis seeks to exploit the stylized 
fact that culture is transmitted from parents to offspring (similarly to the genes) and takes the 
advantage of this correlation between cultural and genetic transmission to investigate the cultural 
distances that cannot be proxied in a more direct way (see also Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2016). 
Likewise, we also employ the G allele in polymorphism A118G in the ȝ-opoid receptor gene that 
leads to higher stress in case of social rejection (denoted as A118G). According to Way and 
Liebermann (2010) the G allele in polymorphism A118G in the ȝ-opoid receptor gene is strongly 
correlated to the collectivistic traits that provide psychological protection from social rejection. 
Unfortunately, cross-country coverage for the variable A118G is limited, which qualifies blood 
distance from the UK as our main instrument. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
We also use the epidemiological data on pathogen prevalence put together by Murray and 
Schaller (2010) - denoted as pathogen prevalence. The rationale behind the use of epidemiological 
data is that stronger pathogen prevalence pushed communities to follow collectivist traits that 
emphasize the embeddedQHVVRILQGLYLGXDOVWR³LQ-JURXS´UHODWLRQVKLSVDQGVHWOLPLWVWRRSHQQHVV
towards foreigners (e.g., Murray and Schaller, 2010).  
Apart from the genetic and epidemiological data, we employ the linguistic variable on pronoun 
drop developed by Davis and Abdurazokzoda (2016) as an instrument for cultural emphasis on 
autonomy rather than on in-group embeddedness. According to Kashima and Kashima (1998), the 
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requirement to use pronouns in a language or the license to drop them is linked to the degree of 
psychological differentiation between the speaker and the social context of speech, including the 
conversation partner. Therefore, the linguistic practice RI ³pronoun drop´ UHYHDOV D FXOWXUDO
dimension of central interest, namely the relationship between the individual and the group. Cultures 
with pronoun drop languages tend to be less individualistic. In turn, we employ the linguistic 
variable language developed by Tabellini (2008) that accounts for both the pronoun drop and the 
type of second type pronoun (the so-FDOOHG ³T-V distinction´. Linguists point out that this T-V 
distinction is associated with cultures that pay close attention to the hierarchy of interpersonal 
relations. Therefore, cultures with T-V distinction languages tend to be less individualistic (see 
Kashima and Kashima, 1998). 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 presents the OLS and IV estimates for the effect of individualism on fiscal redistribution 
when the latter is proxied by: (i) government subsidies and transfers (% GDP) [Panel A]; and health 
and education expenses (% GDP) [Panel B]. Even columns of Table 1 control also for the level of 
development, as proxied by GDP per capita. The first stage results in columns (3)-(12) for the data 
described above indicate that the coefficients have the expected sign and are highly significant. 
Moreover, as can be easily verified individualism enters with a positive and highly significant 
coefficient in all alternative specifications. We interpret this empirical finding in the following way. 
In collectivistic societies, ³LQ-JURXS´UHODWLRQVKLSVi.e., stronger family ties) act as a substitute of 
formal risk sharing institutions (i.e., welfare state). These informal risk sharing agreements provide 
a safety net against risk that makes the redistributive policy of the state less necessary and 
consequently the demand for redistribution weaker. Obviously, the opposite holds for societies 
characterized by higher levels of individualism. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 presents OLS and IV estimates for the basic instrument of our analysis, namely blood 
distance from the UK, when employing a set of extended controls to account for other potential 
confounding factors (see Desmet et al., 2009). Thus, we control for: continental effects, legal 
origins, percentages of religious affiliation, population, share of population above 65, ethno-
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linguistic fractionalization and absolute latitude. Economic and demographic controls are obtained 
from the WDI, whereas the remaining controls (i.e., geographical variables, legal origins, major 
religions etc.) are taken from Gorodnichenko and Roland (2016). Evidently, individualism enters 
again with a positive and significant coefficient in all alternative estimates.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
It should be noted that when these controls are incorporated in the specifications of the 
alternative instruments presented in Table 1, it turns out that blood distance from the UK displays 
by far the strongest first stage results. In a battery of robustness checks, we have replaced 
redistributive expenses with tax variables (e.g., direct taxes (% of GDP)), and results, although 
weaker, provide further evidence in favour of a positive relationship between individualism and 
fiscal redistribution. Finally, our results are insensitive to dropping one continent at a time.3    
 
5. Conclusions 
Building on the identification strategy employed by Gorodnichenko and Roland (2016) this study 
seeks to provide evidence for the association between culture and welfare policies. Our empirical 
findings suggest that countries characterized by more individualistic cultural values present higher 
levels of fiscal redistribution. 
 
  
                                                 
3
 All unreported results are available upon request.  
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Figure 1: Reduced form relationship between blood distance from the UK and 
governmental transfers and between blood distance from the UK health and education 
expanses. 
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Table 1: The effect of culture on fiscal redistribution 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 K>^ K>^ /s ?ďůŽŽĚĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh< ? /s ? ? ? ?' ? /s ?ƉĂƚŚŽŐĞŶƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶĐĞ ?

/s ?ƉƌŽŶŽƵŶĚƌŽƉ ?

/s ?ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?
 
Panel A: government subsidies and transfers (%GDP) 

Individualism
 
0.273*** 0.195*** 0.360*** 0.312** 0.415*** 0.454*** 0.411*** 0.474*** 0.268*** 0.191** 0.222*** 0.170** 
 (0.036) (0.044) (0.058) (0.122) (0.062) (0.082) (0.054) (0.127) (0.060) (0.089) (0.054) (0.067) 
GDP per capita  1.853***  0.701  -1.403  -0.887  1.739*  1.947** 
 
 (0.532)  (1.233)  (1.330)  (1.303)  (0.896)  (0.770) 
First-stage results 
Instrumental variable   -15.600*** -7.974*** -1.457*** -1.068*** -23.425*** -14.891*** -27.620*** -17.071*** -22.691*** -17.465*** 
   (2.491) (2.798) (0.330) (0.187) (2.411) (3.674) (5.257) (4.442) (3.447) (2.540) 
F-stat   39.22 8.122 19.45 32.76 94.40 16.43 88.35 40.03 43.32 47.29 
Observations 83 83 83 83 33 33 83 83 72 72 61 61 
R2 0.486 0.543 0.437 0.490 0.297 0.252 0.361 0.244 0.491 0.535 0.516 0.548 
 
Panel B: health and education expenses (%GDP) 
 
Individualism
 
0.091*** 0.057*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.107*** 0.079*** 0.131*** 0.113*** 0.119*** 0.093*** 0.100*** 0.086*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.019) (0.046) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.030) (0.018) (0.028) (0.015) (0.019) 
GDP per capita  0.761***  0.096  0.838***  0.234  0.561*  0.567** 
  (0.195)  (0.442)  (0.240)  (0.302)  (0.316)  (0.250) 
First-stage results 
Instrumental variable   -15.994*** -8.332*** -1.508*** -1.036*** -23.620*** -15.213*** -27.398*** -17.153*** -21.498*** -16.926*** 
   (2.437) (2.670) (0.318) (0.185) (2.282) (3.620) (5.053) (4.281) (3.408) (2.357) 
F-stat   43.08 9.736 22.47 31.21 107.1 17.66 94.83 38.63 39.78 51.56 
Observations 91 91 91 91 33 33 91 91 64 64 64 64 
R2 0.485 0.578 0.376 0.410 0.577 0.714 0.395 0.473 0.539 0.613 0.563 0.637 
Notes: The table shows two panels one for each of the two dependent variables, government subsidies and transfers and health and education expenses. The F-stat is the F statistic for the explanatory power of the excluded 
instrument in first stage regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** (**, *) denotes statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 2: The effect of culture on fiscal redistribution: Extended set of controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
government subsidies and transfers (%GDP) health and education expenses (%GDP) 
 
 
K>^ /s ?ďůŽŽĚĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh< ? K>^ /s ?ďůŽŽĚĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh< ?
Individualism
 
0.184*** 0.222*** 0.103** 0.122** 0.053*** 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.120*** 
 (0.054) (0.074) (0.049) (0.053) (0.016) (0.021) (0.031) (0.035) 
GDP per capita 0.458 0.341 0.722 0.895 0.885*** 0.376* 0.337 0.413 
 (1.012) (0.920) (0.668) (0.769) (0.193) (0.226) (0.303) (0.284) 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization -4.780* -5.795** -4.834** -4.487** -0.974 -1.283 -1.343 -1.190 
 (2.594) (2.926) (2.427) (2.230) (0.963) (0.926) (0.908) (0.853) 
Population -0.704 -0.900 -0.130 -0.210 -1.019*** -1.360*** -1.435*** -1.502*** 
 (1.175) (1.293) (0.907) (0.912) (0.370) (0.328) (0.410) (0.421) 
Population above 65 -0.197 0.023 -0.169 -0.167 0.074 0.027 0.018 0.020 
 (0.197) (0.191) (0.153) (0.168) (0.052) (0.061) (0.057) (0.056) 
Latitude -0.063 0.045 0.014 -0.015 -0.030 -0.048*** -0.058*** -0.074** 
 (0.068) (0.058) (0.058) (0.071) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022) (0.029) 
First-stage results 
Instrumental variable 
 
-12.884*** -12.076*** -11.359*** 
 
-11.752*** -10.656*** -9.632*** 
 
 
(2.485) (2.448) (2.497) 
 
(2.280) (2.368) (2.419) 
F-stat 
 
26.87 24.34 20.70 
 
26.57 20.25 15.86 
Legal Origins Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Continent dummies Y N Y Y Y N Y Y 
Religion Y N N Y Y N N Y 
Observations 68 68 68 68 77 77 77 77 
R2 0.847 0.712 0.832 0.841 0.804 0.749 0.741 0.735 
F-stat  26.87 24.34 20.70  26.57 20.25 15.86 
Notes: The instrument is the blood distance from the UK. The F-stat is the F statistic for the explanatory power of the excluded instrument in first stage regressions. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** (**, *) denotes statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
 
 
